Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
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- ISBN13: 9780226567709
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Product Description
Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl—a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq—considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Urgent situation from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975.
In examining these two events, Nagl—the theme of a recent New York Times Magazine take in tale by Peter Maass—argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which clarifies why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war as a replacement for as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics made by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Urgent situation.
With a new preface shiny on the leader’s combat experience in Iraq, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.
In examining these two events, Nagl—the theme of a recent New York Times Magazine take in tale by Peter Maass—argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which clarifies why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war as a replacement for as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics made by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Urgent situation.
With a new preface shiny on the leader’s combat experience in Iraq, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.
(20060115)
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This is a flawed and dull dissertation comparing how armies learn. This institutional view uses the Malaysian Urgent situation and the British Army in comparison to the Vietnam War and the US Army. This is a well-researched thesis by a rising star in our Army, but he draws the incorrect conclusions from Malaya and terms Vietnam a defeat. He seems to judge that our army did not adapt its tactics in Vietnam. That is incorrect.
The real question is why do we forget our lessons so quickly? Why do our leaders cling to major weapons systems when this type of conflict is one of dismounted infantry, civil affairs and psyops troops?
Reader’s Rating: 1 / 5
Haven’t read the book reasonably yet. I plot to get it done by the time I am to attend CCC though.
Reader’s Rating: 4 / 5
This is not truly a book about insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. According to Nagl, his thesis open in this book is to examine “how armies learn.” Nagl uses as case studies the British counterinsurgent battle in Malaya and the U.S. battle in Vietnam to clarify his thesis on how armies learn. Consequently this is not a book about insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. It would be very misleading to promote that thought, and in fact treacherous, especially in light of what is in the works in the world today. Beyond that, Nagl uses the fallacy of a fake past analogy in attempting to compare the situations in Malaya and Vietnam. Just as there are very few similarities between our present conflict in Iraq and that of Vietnam, there are very few right similarities between Malaya and Vietnam. The second fake analogy Nagl used was to compare the British Army with the U.S. Army. The two had and have different missions and approach various types of military operations in different manners, automatically. Consequently, by using these fake analogies, Nagl presents misleading conclusions. Be leery of the “Counterinsurgency Manual” also. We establish many inaccuracies in it as well. For much more accurate information and views on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, read Bernard Fall or even Galula.
Reader’s Rating: 1 / 5
Brilliant analysis of the past and present military/political war issues. Should be a mandated reading for all politicians and military personnel at all levels, with the senior officers buying in to the premise. Redundancy is an issue in the writing but it does stress the points.
Reader’s Rating: 5 / 5
I bought a copy of this book for my boyfriend, serving in the US Army. He enjoys it, recommended it to his fellow officers.
Reader’s Rating: 5 / 5